“OLVIA-PRESS”

BIG PROBLEMS OF BIG PRIVATIZATION.

We are surrounded by states, which to different extent of success aspire to come to market economy. In order to achieve active cooperation with them, Dniestria has to move the same way. Privatization is not only one of signs of market relationship but also a good way of attracting an efficient owner to unprofitable enterprises. Namely by means of de-statalization, alienation, and privatization it supposed to achieve reconstruction, modernization, and revival of such kinds of objects for them to get an opportunity to fill up the state treasury, which acquires particular importance under conditions of the economic blockade and tough pressing of Moldova.

The process of de-statalization has been going for few years already but in fact only ‘small’ privatization is taking place. Generally, division of the privatization into ‘big’ and ‘small’ is rather conditional. Objects of the industrial complex and of the social-cultural purpose as well as the dwelling fund undergo both types. But under action of the first one there fall only those objects, which do not have considerable influence upon the state economy. However it is worth mentioning that nearly any large enterprise can be divided into smaller ones thus transforming an actually ‘big’ privatization into a ‘small’ one as well as the law on monopolist activity may be disobeyed. By the way, just because of this, it is reasonable to carry inventory revision of the whole state property in purpose of its rational usage. Unfortunately, it takes much, and the republic is not able to allow it to itself, that’s why inventory revision is being carried out directly during the process of privatization, and of course, it’s a little bit late.

When considering the law on de-statalization and privatization, at first sight it may seem socially unfair. According to the law, the laws of citizens are equal in the process of de-statalization and privatization, but at the same time, collectives or lessees of privatization objects have privileged right for its ransom. Such a seeming contradiction in the law is quite explainable though sounding strange. Indeed, it is human and reasonable to give opportunities for first-term privatization namely to benefactors of an enterprise: they already possess knowledge in the domain they work and as well they get certain sureness in preserving their labor places (such sureness cost much today). But some collectives, benefiting this right and getting ready for privatization of their enterprise, pass it beforehand to rent (partially or wholly) to themselves under conditions very profitable for them, and sometimes even free. There also take place cases of uprating the real amortization potentials of the enterprise in purpose of reducing its real price. It is mainly conditioned by specific interpretation of the law about de-statalization and by the same attitude towards a lessee as an owner. Meanwhile one should not forget that the state is nevertheless the owner of the rented object. Here is worth referring to the Russian experience, where the lessee or working collective have the privileged right of redeeming the aliened object unless someone else offers more advantageous conditions to the state.

Basing on the law, establishing equality in the privatization process, one may conclude that any citizen, being in sensible mind and memory, may become a joint-stock holder. He may but the specific of our Dniestrian variant of the privatization is the one that the overwhelming majority of citizens, especially of the budget-sphere benefactors (medics, teachers, law-keeping bodies and special services, pensioners, etc.), will not participate in it. They won’t because of 2 reasons. Firstly because objects of the budget sphere are not going to be privatized, and secondly because no values such as vouchers give the right of taking part in the privatization are supposed. Our privatization has a market character: if you have money you purchase joint-stocks, if not … The latter may be taken for granted, if we think why we should accept people to this or that branch, if they do not have any understanding and ability to invest money, and why should we also give the suffrage to them? Besides, if a budget-sphere benefactor does not want to be a joint-stock holder, no one knows whom and by which price he will sell his voucher (that is, the suffrage), as it was in Russia or Moldova. However a question appears: for example, why does every citizen have the suffrage during elections, and no one asks him what he will do with it? Meanwhile, political votes are sold and bought as easily as vouchers. But still, elections and privatization are qualitatively different, and incomparable processes. Besides, the privatization’s goal is not justice at all, but the most optimal and sufficient use of property for sake of getting profit. In this context, everyone who will not take part in the privatization directly (it means, without applying any reports, risking absolutely nothing), may expect on time payment of wages, pensions, benefits, and so on (which are quite likely to be bigger) from the privatization, and, as consequence, from filling up the treasury.

Debarring of citizens, unable to buy joint-stocks, from the process of privatization, and simultaneous advantage of lessees and working collectives lead to appearance of a big number of closed joint-stock companies (CJSC). But none of working collectives is able to reconstruct, modernize, and revive independently a big enterprise even if he benefits the legal right of redeeming the object by installments (of a year). Here would be as well good to refer to the Russian experience, where CJSC with number of joint-stock holders exceeding 50 is automatically re-registered into an open joint-stock company. Besides, those collectives, who managed to privatize and revive their enterprises, have already done it.

Attraction of capital from outside, especially of foreign investments, on which the main stake is put, is necessary. The republic cannot take large credits (of course if someone is going to give them to us) on the security of the treasury or state property: the treasury is empty, if there is a necessity of credits, and enterprises are better not to be pawned as the experience of Moldova shows. But the privatization lets attract investors for its development without losing state control over this or that object. Moreover that advantage of such an approach also consists in the fact that none of investors has no legal right to re-profile, to close the privatized object or to fire the previous personnel, as it could happen, be he, for example, a representative of a competitor's enterprise or organization.

As it was already said, privatization in Dniestria has been going for about 2 years, nut one cannot judge yet about the extent of its success and sufficiency. The today's attitude and approach of the republic's government to the privatization undoubtedly possesses analysis of experience of other states' privatization. But despite all precautionary measures, which are quite important and necessary, despite all attempts not to repeat others' mistakes, yet we are not assured from ours. For example, many objects for sale have not found their owners yet. Perhaps, the main reason of that consists in insecurity of the potential investor in the stability. The investor is afraid to lose his money as a result of quite possible transformations, which may make any contracts and agreements, made in our republic, invalid. Yet we do not think that authorities of Moldova will be led by their greed and will fall into clinches with foreign representatives of big business. Maybe namely because of indecision of investors, there have lately appeared of de-statalization and alienation of objects, which have not been presented for privatization yet, but need intent attention from the state and at the same are more attractive and profitable for investments. Only time may show quite exactly how much the state will gain as a result of the privatization. And as for potential joint-stock holders and investors, in their place one would better think, whether we should miss opportunities opening to us; after all, major part of significant enterprises of the former MSSR is situated namely in the territory of the Dniester Moldavian Republic.

A.Berezovski.